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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-3439
__________
CRAIG MOSS,
Appellant
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA
BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE; JOHN/JAN DOE 1 REGIONAL
DIRECTOR OF PAROLE; DAVID WOODRING, Field Officer of PA Parole Board;
TOM WOLF, Governor of Pennsylvania; JOSH SHAPIRO, Attorney General of
Pennsylvania; JOHN TALABOR, Secretary, Board of Probation and Parole; S.
KERWIN, Staff Tech, PA Board of Probation and Parole; KIOYONA DUNCAN,
Supervisor, York Field Office, PA Board of Probation and Parole
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-02197)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 12, 2020
Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 9, 2020)
___________
OPINION *
___________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM
Craig Moss, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss
his amended complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
I.
While on parole, Moss was charged in the York County Court of Common Pleas
with simple assault, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1), and harassment, 18 Pa. C.S.A.
§ 2709(a)(1). As a result of those charges, Moss was taken into custody on May 31,
2016, and incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill pursuant to a parole violator warrant. Moss was
acquitted on the assault and harassment charges, and the parole violator warrant was
cancelled. He was released from custody on July 14, 2016. The Court of Common Pleas
later granted Moss’s petition for expungement of the May 2016 charges.
Moss filed a complaint in the York County Court of Common Pleas alleging that
his civil rights were violated in connection with his arrest and six-week detention. The
defendants removed the action to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. Moss
filed an amended complaint, naming as defendants the Pennsylvania General Assembly,
the Governor and Attorney General of Pennsylvania, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole, and several Board employees. He raised claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), the
Pennsylvania constitution, and Pennsylvania’s Criminal History Record Information Act
2

(“CHRIA”). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended
that the motion to dismiss be granted, concluding that Moss’s claims were either
meritless, untimely, or barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity or the doctrine of
respondeat superior. Over Moss’s objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation and granted the motion to dismiss. Moss timely
appealed. 1
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise do novo
review over the order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Davis v. Samuels,
962 F.3d 105, 111 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

1

Moss raises several threshold procedural challenges to the District Court’s dismissal of
the complaint. These challenges lack merit. First, he complains that a complaint that
survives screening by the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 cannot later be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). But the District Court did not screen Moss’s complaint under
§ 1915 and, even if it had, nothing prevented the District Court from later granting the
defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Moss also complains that the District Court dismissed
claims that the defendants did not challenge in their motion to dismiss. Contrary to
Moss’s assertion, the defendants did broadly contest all of Moss’s claims. Notably, in his
objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, Moss did not allege
that the defendants had waived any challenges to his claims. Furthermore, Moss’s
reliance on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12(h)(1) is misplaced, as that rule expressly
exempts Rule 12(b)(6) motions from its waiver rule. See Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d
825, 830 (7th Cir. 1995) (observing that if the motion to dismiss were based on 12(b)(6),
defendant “would escape the clutches of Rule 12(h)(1)”). Finally, contrary to Moss’s
suggestion, the defendants’ removal of the case to federal court did not constitute a tacit
concession that Moss had stated viable claims for relief.
3

plausible on its face.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. 2 See Fairview Twp. v.
EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985).
III.
A.

Respondeat Superior

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must establish that she was deprived of
a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626,
646 (3d Cir. 2009). It is well settled, however, that liability under § 1983 may not be
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69
n.14 (3d Cir. 1993). Instead, the plaintiff must show that the official’s conduct caused
the deprivation of a federally protected right. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
166 (1985). More particularly, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant was personally
involved in the deprivation. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.

2

In addition, an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief
forfeits that issue on appeal. See M.S. by & through Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch.
Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2020). Here, as the appellees argue, Moss has not
challenged the District Court’s dismissal of several of his claims. Appellees’ Br., 15.
Most notably, Moss’s opening brief did not challenge the dismissal of the Pennsylvania
General Assembly on immunity grounds. Accordingly, we will not review the claims
against the General Assembly.
4

1988). “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or
of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Id. As the District Court correctly explained,
Moss alleged that only one of the named individual defendants, Parole Officer Woodring,
had any direct role in his arrest and detention. Moss nowhere alleged that the remaining
individual defendants directly participated in, or had knowledge of, the actions described
in his complaint. 3 Nor did Moss allege that those defendants acquiesced in the alleged
unconstitutional misconduct or failed to properly train subordinate employees. See Gilles
v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 207 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the District Court properly
concluded that, with the exception of Parole Officer Woodring, Moss failed to allege that
the individual defendants had any personal involvement in the alleged denials of his
constitutional rights.
B.

Sixth and Eighth Amendment Claims

There is also no merit to Moss’s claims under the Sixth Amendment. Relying on
Cobb v. Aytch, 643 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1981), Moss asserted that his incarceration at SCI
Camp Hill, rather than the York County Prison, interfered with his Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel. Cobb is inapposite, however, because, among

3

Although Moss referred to a conspiracy, his conclusory allegations were insufficient to
suggest that a conspiratorial agreement existed between the defendants. See Great W.
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that conclusory allegations of an agreement do not meet the pleading standards;
instead, specific facts addressing the time the agreement was made, the period of the
conspiracy, the exact parties to the agreement, and the object of the conspiracy are
required).
5

other things, it involved plaintiffs who were transferred to prisons that were between 90
and 300 miles from the county where their criminal cases originated. Id. at 950. By
contrast, Moss was incarcerated a state prison that is 26 miles from the York County
Prison. We further note that Moss’s Sixth Amendment claim is undermined by the fact
that he waived his right to counsel shortly after his arrest on the parole violator warrant.
(ECF 10-3.)
Moss also asserted that his detention on the parole violator warrant violated his
rights under the Eighth Amendment. The District Court properly explained, though, that
a parolee has no constitutional right to release on bail before a parole revocation hearing.
See Luther v. Molina, 627 F.2d 71, 76 n.10 (7th Cir. 1980). In addition, the loss of
Moss’s job and the foreclosure on his home – which were purely incidental consequences
of his incarceration, not the direct result of the government’s extraction of any payment –
did not constitute a violation of the Constitution’s Excessive Fines Clause. See Austin v.
United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993) (stating that the Excessive Fines Clause
“limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in case or in kind, as
punishment for some offense”) (internal citation and emphasis omitted); cf. United States
v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting excessive fines claim where
there was no evidence that loss of properties in foreclosure sales was caused by the
government’s seizure of the properties). Furthermore, Moss did not allege that the
conditions he experienced while confined on the parole violator warrant constituted cruel
and unusual punishment so as to warrant relief under the Eighth Amendment. See
6

Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 106
n.8 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the “constitutional rights of parolees are at least as
extensive as those of convicted prisoners”).
C.

False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Abuse of Process, and Malicious Prosecution
As the defendants conceded in the District Court, (ECF 10, 2 n.4), a state waives

its immunity from suit when it removes a case to federal court. See Lombardo v.
Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2008). But because the
state “retains all defenses it would have enjoyed had the matter been litigated in state
court, including immunity from liability,” id. at 198, a state may waive its immunity from
suit without “waiv[ing] any defenses provided by its own sovereign immunity law.” Id.
at 200. Here, the defendants asserted they were entitled to immunity from liability
pursuant to 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2310. Under that provision, the Commonwealth and its
officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties are immune from lawsuits
except in specified situations, see 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522, none of which applies here.
Officer Woodring’s alleged actions – arresting and detaining Moss pursuant to parole
violator warrant – were necessarily within the scope of his employment as a parole
officer. See 61 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 6152 (authorizing parole officers to arrest without a
warrant a parolee for violating parole conditions); 6138(b)(1) (providing that the “formal
filing of a charge after parole against a parolee within for any violation of the laws of this
Commonwealth shall constitute an automatic detainer and permit the parolee to be taken
into and held in custody”). Moss did not allege that Officer Woodring acted in such a
7

way as to bring his conduct outside the scope of his employment. Accordingly, we
conclude that Officer Woodring, a Commonwealth party, is immune from liability on
Moss’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and malicious
prosecution. 4
D.

U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1

Moss attempted to raise a claim under Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United
States Constitution, which provides that “[n]o State shall … pass any Bill of Attainder …
[or] Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ….”5 A bill of attainder is “a legislative
Act which inflicts punishment on named individuals or members of an easily
ascertainable group without a judicial trial.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384
n.30 (1968). But the parole statute does not constitute a bill of attainder because it did
not inflict punishment on Moss or any group to which he belongs. Cf. Story v. Rives, 97
F.2d 182, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (holding that statute requiring service of remainder of
original sentence for parole violators was not a bill of attainder). Instead, it required
automatic detention on his original sentence because he was charged with a new criminal

4

In light of this determination, we will not address the District Court’s conclusion that
Moss’s false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process claims were time-barred.
Likewise, we will not consider the District Court’s determination that the malicious
prosecution claim failed because a parole proceeding is not tantamount to a criminal
prosecution.
5

Moss also cited Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, of the United States Constitution. That
provision, however, applies only to the federal government’s passage of a bill of
attainder. Moss, of course, challenged Pennsylvania’s parole statute.
8

offense. See 61 Pa. C.S.A. § 6138(b). In addition, Moss failed to state a claim under the
Contract Clause. Moss claimed that his detention caused him to lose his job and fail to
pay his mortgage. Those allegations, however, did not demonstrate that a “change in
state law has ‘operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.’”
General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (quoting Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)); see also Transport Workers Union,
Local 290 v. SEPTA, 145 F.3d 619, 621 (3d Cir. 1998).
E.

Civil RICO Claims, State Constitutional Claims, and Claims under the CHRIA
The District Court also properly dismissed Moss’s civil RICO claims, his state

constitutional claims, and his claims under the CHRIA. In particular, his conclusory
assertion that the defendants’ actions constituted civil racketeering activity is insufficient
to state a claim for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 1962. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that
allegations supporting a conspiracy claim under civil RICO must be sufficiently specific).
Moreover, to the extent that Moss alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution, he
failed to state a claim, as Pennsylvania does not recognize a private right of action for
damages in a lawsuit alleging a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Jones v.
City of Phila., 890 A.2d 1188, 1208 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (“[N]either Pennsylvania
statutory authority nor appellate case law has authorized the award of money damages for
violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”). Moss also cited a provision of CHRIA
providing that “[a] person found by the court to have been aggrieved by a violation of this
9

chapter or the rules or regulations promulgated under this chapter” can receive certain
forms of relief. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 9183. But Moss’s conclusory proclamation that the
defendants “refuse[d] to adhere to a[n] expungement order” is insufficient to state a claim
under that law. See Taha v. Cty. of Bucks, 862 F.3d 292, 302 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating that
“the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that ‘[a] party is aggrieved if he can
demonstrate that he has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the
litigation’”) (citing Pa. Gaming Control Bd. v. City Council of Phila., 928 A.2d 1255,
1265-66 (Pa. 2007)).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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